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DISASTER ASSISTANCE FOR U.S. FARMER& 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT DEBATE AND TWO PROPOSALS 
The U.S. drought of 1988 has focused attention on federal 
assistance to farmers affected by drought and other natural 
disasters. However, disaster aid for farm operators has been a 
s igni f leant claimant on federal outlays since the mid-1970s. 
Current aid programs include emergency loans, direct payments, and 
subsidized crop insurance. Historically, cost of this assistance 
has been viewed as unacceptably high, resulting in continuous 
national debate and associated policy experimentation. Genealogy 
of this debate is explored, and two proposals are advanced. 
A Fara Level View of Disaster Assistance 
Farm disaster assistance was negligible prior to 1975 (Table 
1) . In contrast, between 1975 and 1982, disaster loans and 
payments averaged 8. 5% of annual net farm cash flow. Despite a 
sharp decline for the 1983 to 1987 period, disaster assistance 
still averaged 2.8% of annual net farm cash flow. 
The increase in disaster assistance during the mid-1970s was 
as soc i a ted with changes in the farm production/financial 
environment. One change was increased variability in crop yields 
(Figure 1). For major U.S. cereal crops, the standard deviation 
about trend line aggregate yield equalled 4. 6% of average 
aggregate yield from 1950 through 1969. Between 1970 and 1988 
this ratio more than doubled to 11.0%. 
During the 1970-1988 period, the largest year-over-year 
declines were years of national drought (1974, 1980, 1983, and 
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Table 1. Average Annual Disaster Payments and Loans to Farmers, U.S .• Selected Periom, 1950-87 
--·------
Agricultural Stabilization am 
Conservatim Service PavEnts 
Farners lblE Federal Crop Insuram:e Disastel' Aid's Share 
Adninistration Loansa Net Io:lem.i tiesb of Net Farm Cash Flow Pel'iod 
Crops Lives~ Total 
Fiscal YeaI'S - - - - - - - - Million $ - - - - - - - - - - - % - -
1950-64 NP'1 __ e _e 52.9 
1965-74 ~ __ e _e 150.8 
1975-82 484.6 75.8 560.4 2414.3 
1983-87 134.4g 17.4g 151.8 488.0 
a Incl\Xles eaergency disaster and guaranteed eneI'l!ellCY livestock loans. 
b II¥1emnities millls preniuns plus subsidy. 
(1.5l 0.4 
(3.8)f 0.7 
48.0 8.5 
304.0 2.8 
c Inclmes ooly federal experditures for the cost-sharing of feed~ by f8I'IEI'S beyoOO their IKmllll amunt. Hay and 
cattle transportation assistance WBS so Slllll.l it was mt reported as a separate l:udget entry by Qmoodity Credit Corporation. 
Purehase of goverment stocks at prices below the loan rate was ooly reported by pomdage or Wshels. No experditure data 
are available. 
d No progl""dlllS. 
e No infomation was fcnnd on annual costs of the livestock m"Oeims. 
f Preni\JllS exceeded iI¥lemnities. 
g Inclmes the value of JlfYllll!nt-in-hmi certificates issued as part of the 1986 drought relief legislation for the U.S. 
southeast. 
Sources: camoodity Credit Corporation (ere), lqllblished data. 
ere, History of Budgetary Fixpel!iitures, Fiscal Years 1961-1979 Actual 
ere, History of Budgetary Fixpel!iitures of the ra.xlity Credit Corporation, Fiscal Years 1980-1987 Actual 
Famers lbne Adninistration, farme:rs lbne Adninistration, Total ~ligations Turough Fiscal Year 1987 
Federal Crop Insurance Corporation, unp.tblished data 
U.S. Department of Agriculture (lSlf\), Agricultural CMtlook, October 1988 
lmf\, Agr!_cultural Statistics 
'lSl\, Econanic Irrlicators of the Farm Sector, National Financial Stlllnary, 1986 
.f- ' ' r _, 
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FIGURE 1. CEREAL YIELDS, U.S., 1950-1988 
MARKETING YEARS •,•• 
Yield (Metric Tons Per Hectare) 
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1988). Since droughts (natural disasters) occurred from 1950 · ... 
through 1969, they are probably not the sole cause of the increase 
in yield variability. However, they are clearly a factor. 
A second change in the farm environment was a decline in 
self-insurance by farm operators (Table 2). Farm household 
financial assets declined from 78% of farm cash expenses during 
1950-54 to 37% from 1970-74 to 29% in 1986. Similar declines are 
noted when farmer-held crop and livestock inventories and/or 
nonfarm household income are added to household financial assets 
(Table 2). On the positive side, self-insurance has increased 
since the early 1980s, partly because of lower cash expenses. 
Another aspect of self-insurance is that it declines as farm 
size increases (Figure 2). For 1986, financial assets plus crop 
and livestock inventories declined from 295% of cash expenses for 
farms with gross farm sales less than $10, 000 to 66% for farms 
with gross sales of $500,000 or more. In short, commercial farms 
appear to be most at risk if a natural disaster strikes. 
A third change in the farm environment was the implementation 
of target prices/deficiency payments for major field crops in 
1973. This change undermined a form of natural disaster insurance 
based on the short-term inelastic demand for crops. Inelastic 
demand implies that a given percent decline in market production 
causes a larger percent increase in market price. Consequently, 
in a market without deficiency payments, income earned by farmers 
as a group increases when a natural disaster reduces market 
production. 
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Table 2: Self Insurance by Fara Operators, U.S., 1950-1986a 
Year 
1950-54 
1955-59 
1960-64 
1965-69 
1970-74 
1975-79 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
Cash 
Expenses 
(billion $) 
18.0 
20.1 
25.0 
31.9 
47.0 
78.5 
111.l 
115.3 
114.9 
115.8 
118.8 
112.0 
102.4 
Financial 
Assetsb 
78.3 
72.6 
54.0 
46.4 
37.4 
24.3 
18.0 
17.6 
18.2 
18.8 
19.8 
22.3 
28.6 
a Includes farm households. 
Cash Expense 
Liquid 
Assetsc 
- - - - % 
202.7 
173.6 
147.2 
121.0 
134.5 
106.0 
102.3 
89.2 
88.4 
82.2 
86.4 
84.3 
93.1 
b Deposits, currency, and U.S. Savings Bonds. 
Goverage Ratio __ _ 
Nonfarm Income<f Plus 
Financial Assets 
120.6 
111.9 
94.0 
92.2 
84.7 
60.0 
49.2 
48.7 
49.9 
50.8 
52.0 
60.0 
72.3 
c Deposits, currency, U.S. Savings Bonds, livestock, and crops. 
d Nonfarm income of farm operators for 1950-1959 was estimated using the 
following equation: Y = -234.16 + 1.23X (R2 = .994) where y = nonfarm 
income of farm operators and X personal income of farm population from 
nonfarm sources. The equation was estimated over the period 1960-1969. 
Farm population nonfarm income was obtained from Economic Indicators of 
the Fa~m_sector: Income and Balance Sheet Statistics, 1983. 
SOURCE: Economic Indicators of the Farm Sector, National Financial 
Summary, 1986. 
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FIGURE 2. SELF INSURANCE BY FARM OPERATORS 
BY FARM SIZE. U.S •• 1986. 
Coverage of Cash Expenses (I)* 
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Gross Farm Sales 
• Excludes household cash expenses. 
•• Includes household assets. 
Financial Assets •• 
Financial Assets •• 
+ Crops & Livestock 
Financial Assets •• 
+ Off-Farm Income 
SOURCE: Economic Indicators of the Farm Sector: National 
Financial Summary, 1986. 
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The impact of a natural disaster on individual farmers 
depends on the change in their production (yield) relative to 
changes in 11arket production (yield). If their production 
declines no more than market production, they will earn more 
income as higher prices more than compensates for their loss of 
production. Even farmers whose production declines more than 
national production benefit from the higher prices associated with 
the short-term inelastic demand. 
Current farm income support programs undermine this insurance 
whenever market price is below the target price and above the loan 
rate. Under this scenario, the benefits of higher prices are 
largely offset by lower deficiency payments (difference between 
target price and higher of market price or loan rate). 
The insurance provided by short-term inelastic demand takes 
on added significance because drought is by far the largest cause 
of yield loss (Figure 3). Droughts have a greater tendency than 
other natural disasters to affect market production and, thus, 
trigger the inelastic demand-driven price response. 
Disaster Assistance Prograas 
Baergency Loans 
Loans to farmers affected by natural disasters were first 
authorized in the Disaster Loan Act of 1949. Farmers Home 
Administration (FmHA) was designated as the lending agency. It 
has since lent approximately $23 billion in emergency disaster 
loans to farmers, most as direct loans. 
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FIGURE 3. AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF FEDERAL 
CROP INDEMNITIES ATTRIBUTED TO SPECIFIC 
HAZARDS, 1948-86 
Drought--511 
Frost/Freeze--101 
SOURCE: Agricultural Statistics. 1987 (USDA) . 
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A second natural disaster loan program involved FmHA 
guarantees of commercial loans to financially distressed livestock 
and poultry producers. This program was authorized by the 
Emergency Livestock Credit Act of 1974:.. It ended in 1979 after 
$1.0 billion had been lent. 
The annual volume of FmHA disaster loans was largest from 
1975 through 1982, when an average of $2.4 billion was lent (Table 
1). Volume has declined substantially since 1982, in part because 
eligibility criteria for emergency disaster loans were tightened. 
For example, the Food Security Act of 1985 limited eligibility to 
family-size farms who could not obtain credit elsewhere. It also 
repealed FmHA' s authority to make subsequent emergency loans for 
annual production expenses. Furthermore, beginning with crops 
planted and harvested in 1987, only farmers who purchase crop 
insurance are eligible for disaster loans. The latter requirement 
was, however, waived by The Disaster Assistance Act of 1988 for 
1988 drought-related loans. 
As of March 31, 1988, $8. 7 billion in emergency disaster 
loans was outstanding, of which 76% were held by delinquent 
borrowers. Furthermore, loans held by delinquent borrowers on 
March 31, 1988 totalled 38% of all emergency disaster loans that 
had ever been extended through September 30, 1987. Last, as of 
September 30, 1987, 39% of borrowers were delinquent. These high 
delinquency rates suggest emergency disaster loans have often been 
associated with extended periods of financial stress. 
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Direct Disaster Assistance 
Direct assistance to farmers affected by natural disasters 
began in 1961, when livestock producers whose production was 
reduced by natural disaster were permitted to purchase government 
stocks at 75% of the nonrecourse loan rate. The Disaster 
Assistance Act. .. ...Q.L_1988 also permits, under specified conditions, 
government stocks to be sold at a price not to exceed 50% of the 
average market price. Other livestock assistance includes up to a 
50% cost-share for a) feed purchased beyond the normal amount, b) 
transporting hay and forage purchased beyond the normal trade 
area, and c) transporting livestock to grazing areas. While 
numerous, these disaster assistance programs for 1 ivestock 
producers have been small in scope, in part because they are 
limi.ted to producers who grow their own feed (Table 1). 
An important source of disaster assistance for livestock 
farmers in recent years has been the haying/grazing of set-aside 
and conservation reserve acreage. This program does not involve 
direct federal outlays, and thus is not included in Table 1. 
Direct disaster assistance for crop producers was first 
authorized in the AgricuJ.!~r~ and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 
and the Rice Production Act of 1975. Upland cotton, feed grain, 
wheat, and rice farmers who participated in the announced land 
set-aside program were eligible to receive direct payments for 
either prevented planting or low yields. 
The so-called Disaster Payments Program proved costly, 
averaging almost $500 million annually from fj seal years 1975 
10 
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through 1982 (Table 1). Its cost eventually resulted in the 
program being ended after the 1981 crop year by the Federal Crop 
Insurance Act of 1980. Nevertheless, direct assistance to crop 
producers continues to be authorized on an ad hoc basis in years 
of widespread natural disaster. For the 1986 drought in the 
southeast U.S. , approximately $550 million of payment-in-kind 
certificates were authorized for drought assistance. For the 
1988 U.S. drought, the U.S. Department of Agriculture estimates 
that The Disaster Assistance Act of 1988 authorized approximately 
$3.0 billion in assistance for crop farmers. 
Federal Crop Insurance 
The Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980 expanded the then-
existing multiperil federal crop insurance program to replace the 
Disaster Payments Program as the major federal disaster assistance 
program. Federal crop insurance was first authorized by the 
Federa!_Crop Insur~nce Act of 1938 to cover drought, hail, excess 
moisture, frost/freeze, wind, disease, insect, flood, and other 
unavoidable causes of crop losses. Like the attempts of private 
companies before it, the initial federal attempt at multi peril 
insurance incurred large losses. In response, Congress reduced 
crop insurance to an experimental program in 1947. Subsequently, 
a program of limited expansion was undertaken. From 1948 to 1979, 
acres insured increased from 8. 9 to 21. 4 mi 11 ion. Nevertheless, 
participation remained low, accounting for only 6.2% of harvested 
plus failed acres in 1979. 
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To encourage purchase of crop insurance, the Federal Crop 
Insurance Act of 1980 directed the Federal Crop Insurance 
Corporation (FCIC) to develop an individualized insurance program 
based on a farmer's actual production history and authorized 
federal subsidies for premium~. _.; farmer's FCIC program yield is 
based on a 10-year moving average of a farmer's actual or county 
average yield, minus the high and low yield. A farmer who has at 
least three years of verified yields can qualify for the actual 
production history program. 
Farmers who purchase crop insurance elect one of three levels 
of yield protection: 50, 65, and 75% of their FCIC yield. They 
also elect one of three price levels. These price levels vary by 
crop and year. For example, 1989 corn price levels are $1. 50, 
$2. 00, and $2. 60. Insurance payment (indemnity) equals the 
elected price times the following: FCIC yield times elected yield 
protection minus actual yield. 
The premium paid by a farmer depends on the yield protection 
elected, the price elected, his/her yield history, and the premium 
subsidy. The latter equals 30% for the 50 and 65% yield 
elections. For the 75% yield election, it equals the absolute 
dollar subsidy for the 65% yield election. This typically 
translates into a 20-25% subsidy. 
The actual production history option and subsidized premiums, 
along with encouragement from lenders, have resulted in increased 
participation. Acres enrolled totalled a preliminary 49.4 million 
in 1986, an increase of 131% since 1979. Participation was 
12 
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probably higher in 1987 and 1988 and should increase further in 
1989. One reason is that The Disaster-. Ass!_~_tance Act of 1988 
requires, subject to certain exceptions, that farmers purchase 
1989 federal crop insurance if they accept disaster payments and 
if their 1988 yield was less than 35% of their normal yield as 
defined by the Act. A second reason is that farmers with crop 
insurance in 1988 will collect more total assistance, including 
indemnities, than farmers without crop insurance. Nevertheless, 
participation in federal crop insurance remains lower than 
desired. Congress has responded by establishing a commission to 
study the current program. 
S111111ary and Proposals 
Increased yield variability, lower self-insurance by farm 
operators, and income support payments based on target prices have 
combined to increase national attention and resources devoted to 
farm disaster assistance since the mid-1970s. Counting the 
estimated 1988 disaster assistance for crop producers. ad hoc crop 
disaster payments have averaged $612 million since 1982. 
Furthermore, net federal crop insurance indemnities paid to 
farmers have averaged $304 million from 1983 through 1987 (Table 
1) . Taken together, these two programs have averaged over $900 
million annually since 1982. Furthermore, emergency loans have 
averaged about $500 million annually over this period (Table 1). 
The cost of these programs has become a source of national 
concern, especially given the amount of assistance authorized by 
13 
The Disaster A~sistance Act of 1988. Disaster assistance programs 
can also be questioned on economic efficiency grounds. They 
encourage production in high risk areas and partially offset the 
moral hazard of avoidable losses created by poor management 
decisions. 
Despite these concerns, the political system has continually 
reaffirmed America's comm! tment to disaster assistance for 
farmers. In light of this continuing political support, two 
proposals are made for revising current programs. One addresses 
federal crop insurance, while the other concerns a new self-
insurance program. 
A Pederal Crop Insurance Proposal 
Almost every study of federal crop insurance has found that a 
key reason given by farmers for not purchasing insurance is that 
the premium is too high. A lower premium should therefore 
increase participation. One suggestion for reducing premiums is 
to replace the current yield elections, which are stated in terms 
of a farmer's FCIC program yield, to yield elections which are 
stated relative to changes in the corresponding market yield. For 
example, instead of the current greater-than-25% decline in yield 
before indemnities are collected (75% yield election), a farmer's 
yield would have to decline 25 percentage points more than the 
percent decline in national yield. Thus, if national yield 
declined 10%, a farm operator's yield would have to decline more 
than 35% before indemnities are collected. 
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This proposal is keyed to the short term inelastic demand for 
crops. Lower national production due to widespread natural 
disaster means higher market price, which partially or totally 
offsets an individual farmer's loss of production. 
The proposal means that, in years of a large-scale natural 
disaster, fewer farmers would receive crop indemnities, and 
average indemnity would be smaller. In contrast, under the 
current program, more farmers collect higher average indemnities 
in such years, despite higher prices. To illustrate, in 1983, a 
year of major nation-wide drought, indemnities were collected by 
29% of the insured farm units. Net indemnity received averaged 
$11.50 per acre insured. However, in 1984 and 1985, years with 
no nation-wide drought, indemnities were collected by only 21% of 
insured farm units while the average net indemnity equalled $6.50 
per insured acre. 
Therefore this proposal should result in lower premiums and 
higher participation. For major field crops, some of the 
proposal's allure is undercut by the fact that higher prices are 
offset by lower def lciency payments if prices are between the loan 
and target prices. However, because the existing crop insurance 
program requires yield reductions of at least 25% of a 10-year 
moving average, it provides only limited protection against the 
loss of deficiency payment. 
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A.Disaster Assistance Self-Insurance Proposal 
An alternative to current disaster assistance programs is to 
encourage self-insurance by farm operators. This could be 
accomplished by permitting farmers to place up to a pre-specified 
share of their cash farm expenses into an individualized disaster 
assistance account (IDAA). Taxes on income earned by the account 
would be deferred until the year the income is removed from the 
account. Funds could be removed whenever a natural disaster 
caused production to decline a specified amount. Any amount left 
in the IDAA when the farm operator stopped farming could be 
converted into a retirement account. 
Cost of IDAAs to the federal treasury would depend on the 
program's parameters. Assume a farmer can place up to 40% of cash 
expenses into an IDAA and that everyone participates. Because 
cash expenses currently total about $110 billion, $44 billion 
would be contributed to IDAAs. Assume only returns are tax 
deferred and they accrue at an 8% annual rate. Thus, $3.5 
billion would be tax deferred annually. Assume the earned returns 
would be taxed at the highest personal tax rate of 28% in the year 
earned, but at zero when removed from the account. The amount of 
federal income tax lost would, therefore, equal $986 million 
annually. Therefore, even with these conservative assumptions, an 
IDAA of 40% of cash expenses would be no more expensive than the 
current annual cost of disaster assistance. Furthermore, the cost 
of IDAAs could be reduced by tying them into Individual Retirement 
Accounts, which many farmers qualify for and use. 
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Uni Ike current programs which exclude many producers, 
particularly livestock producers who purchase their feed, IDAAs 
would be available to al I producers. Furthermore, the level of 
protection offered by IDAAs for crop producers would be comparable 
to that offered by current programs. The average national cash 
cost of production for 1984 through 1986 was $1.78 for corn, $2.69 
for wheat, and $3. 55 for beans. These figures are, in essence, 
the IDAA payment rate. The payment rates from The Disaster 
Assistance Act of 1988 for participants in 1988 farm programs who 
experienced production losses between 35 and 75% were $1. 90 for 
corn, $2.75 for wheat, and $3.69 for soybeans. The highest price 
election for 1988 crop insurance was $2. 00 for corn, $2. 60 for 
wheat, and $5.00 for beans. 
Assuming that the share of cash expenses which could be 
placed in an IDAA would be less than 100%, IDAAs would not cover 
situations where yields approach zero. To cover this 
possibility, the current crop insurance program could be converted 
into a catastrophe program, with a zero cost to the federal 
government. 
In summary, IDAAs could be designed to cost no more than 
current programs while providing comparable levels of protection. 
Furthermore, they would be available to all farm operators, would 
reduce the need to borrow in an emergency, which the FmHA disaster 
loan program suggests is not a desirable strategy in many cases; 
and may increase savings, an emerging national concern. More 
important, they would encourage a farmer to utilize his/her 
17 
entrepreneurial skills to increase self-insurance, thereby 
enhancing the ability to survive. 
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